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Populism’s Global Impact on Immigrants and 
Refugees: The Perspective of Eritrean 
Refugees in Europe and Israel 
JAMES YAP,† HILINA FESSAHAIE,‡ AND ENBAL SINGER‡  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The populist movements spreading across the globe today have 
come in many different shapes and sizes.  However, one attribute that 
has been relatively consistent among them is that they have thrived 
by stoking anger and resentment against smaller and more vulnerable 
sectors of society.  This has been a fundamental component of the 
illiberal populist playbook.  From Muslims in Modi’s India, to Kurds 
in Erdogan’s Turkey, to Palestinians in Netanyahu’s Israel, populist 
leaders have found that an effective and reliable technique to harness 
general public disaffection for their own political benefit is to channel 
it into hostility towards an already marginalized minority population 
that lacks the political power to fight back. 
In more economically developed countries, populists’ target of 
choice has often been immigrants and refugees. For instance, in the 
U.S., Trump rose to power to exuberant chants of “build the wall,” 
and his administration has flaunted its harsh treatment of Central 
American migrants as a badge of honor.1  In the U.K., the Brexit 
movement was fueled to a large extent by resentment towards recent 
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 1. See, e.g., Kirk Semple, Trump Attracts Central American Support for Hard-Line 
Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/25/world/americas/trump-salvador-
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arrivals from other EU countries.  And in continental Europe, 
hostility towards asylum seekers arriving from the Middle East and 
Africa has been the bread and butter of populist parties such as the 
AfD in Germany, the National Rally (formerly National Front) in 
France, and the Northern League in Italy.  Even where such parties 
do not hold power directly, their popularity and influence have 
caused more moderate governments to shift towards tougher policies 
on immigrants and refugees.2 
Of course, such governments are subject to certain legal 
constraints in the measures they can take to establish their anti-
immigrant credentials with the electorate.  In particular, under 
international refugee law, people who have a legitimate fear of 
persecution should they return to their country of origin are 
considered to be refugees, and no country may deport them back to 
their country of origin.  The international refugee law system, which 
is largely embodied in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
emerged in its present form in the aftermath of World War II, as a 
response to the millions of people displaced by that conflict.3 
The humanitarian principles underpinning the Refugee 
Convention have now gained near universal acceptance globally, and 
the Convention itself currently has 145 States Parties.  However, the 
recent global surge in illiberal populism, with its accompanying 
hostility towards immigrants, has placed strain on this system. This 
comment examines how illiberal populism has affected the 
experience of the global population of refugees originating from one 
particular country: Eritrea.  It is hoped that the experience of this one 
particular population illustrates some of the challenges that the global 
rise of illiberal populism has posed for immigrants and refugees 
generally. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Eritrea is a small country in the Horn of Africa that gained its 
independence from Ethiopia in 1991.  It has one of the world’s most 
repressive governments.4  It has no constitution, active legislature, 
 
 2. MARTIN A. SCHAIN, SHIFTING TIDES: THE RADICAL-RIGHT POPULISM AND THE 
IMMIGRATION POLICY IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 1 (Migration Policy Institute 
2018). 
 3. Frances Nicholson & Judith Kumin, A Guide to International Refugee Protection 
and Building State Asylum Systems, UNHCR (2017), https://www.unhcr.org/3d4aba564.pdf. 
 4. See Countries and Territories, FREEDOM HOUSE (2020), 
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independent judiciary, elections, political opposition, or independent 
media.  It languishes under the dictatorial rule of Isaias Afewerki, 
who has been president since independence. 
Probably its most notorious practice, however, is its system of 
universal forced labor that is euphemistically known as the “National 
Service Program” (NSP).  Under the pretext of fostering economic 
development, effectively every Eritrean who reaches the age of 18 is 
conscripted into the NSP and their labor becomes subject to complete 
state control.5  This means that they are assigned to a job that they are 
not allowed to leave without authorization, or, if they are judged to 
possess certain aptitudes, further education or professional training, 
upon completion of which they are then assigned to a job that they 
are not allowed to leave without authorization.  This program 
encompasses effectively the country’s entire workforce, from manual 
laborers on farms or in factories to white-collar professions such as 
doctors, lawyers, judges, public servants, and engineers.  Attempts to 
flee one’s assigned job are met with severe punishment, including 
arbitrary detention and/or torture.  The NSP has been recognized by 
the International Labor Organization (ILO) as constituting forced 
labor and by the United Nations as constituting slavery.6 
This unorthodox system has also been the primary motivation 
cited for the thousands of Eritreans who flee the country as refugees 
every year.  According to United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) figures, despite its tiny population, Eritrea ranks 
as the ninth largest country of origin for refugees with over half a 
million Eritrean refugees living outside the country.7  Most of these 
are in neighboring Ethiopia or Sudan.  However, many have ventured 
further afield, and these are largely concentrated in two main clusters. 
The first cluster is in Israel.  These refugees have made the 
voyage over land through Sudan and Egypt, generally paying human 
smugglers for their transport.  Those who safely made this journey 
before December 2013 have been able to enter Israel.  After that, 
however, a fence built for the purpose of stopping such migration has 
 
https://freedomhouse.org/countries/freedom-world/scores (showing a 2/100 “global freedom 
score”). 
 5. Eritrea: Events in 2017, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Mar. 6, 2020), 
https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2018/country-chapters/eritrea. 
 6. See Service for Life: State Repression and Indefinite Conscription in Eritrea, 
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 2009), at 81-83, 
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/eritrea0409web_0.pdf. 
 7. Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2018, UNHCR (June 20, 2019), 
https://www.unhcr.org/5d08d7ee7.pdf. 
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cut off this route.8 
The second cluster is in Europe.  These refugees have also 
generally paid human smugglers for passage through the Sahara to 
somewhere on the southern Mediterranean coast, typically Libya. 
There, they board ships bound for a littoral country in Europe, 
usually Italy.9 
III. ERITREAN REFUGEES IN EUROPE 
The ships that human smugglers use to transport migrants 
originally from Eritrea (along with those from many other African 
countries) across the Mediterranean into Europe are often in 
dangerously poor condition.  They often founder at sea with 
calamitous results. 
In October 2013, a shipwreck off of Lampedusa resulted in an 
estimated 368 deaths.10  Later that month, the Italian government set 
up a search and rescue operation named Mare Nostrum with the goal 
of preventing similar tragedies in future.  Because a previous 
European Court of Human Rights ruling prevented Italy from 
forcibly returning such migrants to Libya where they embarked due 
to the human rights conditions and ongoing civil war there, all 
migrants rescued at sea were being brought to Italy.11 
However, Operation Mare Nostrum attracted vocal domestic 
political opposition. Around the same time, the far-right Northern 
League under its new leader Matteo Salvini was beginning the 
ascension that would see it rise from roughly 5% popular support 
nationally to key partner in the ruling coalition by 2018.  Like many 
of its European populist counterparts, it accomplished this in no small 
part by aggressively campaigning on hardline positions on 
immigration. In particular, they fostered hostility towards the Mare 
Nostrum program and portrayed it as merely encouraging illegal 
immigration to Europe at Italy’s expense.12  This political climate 
 
 8. Harriet Sherwood, Israeli Fence Construction Cuts Off Migration from Egypt, THE 
GUARDIAN (Dec. 31, 2012), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/dec/31/israeli-fence-
cuts-migration-egypt. 
 9. Aryn Baker, Rescue at Sea: A Week on Board a Refugee Recovery Ship, TIME 
(Mar. 6, 2020), https://time.com/refugee-rescue/.   
 10. Pierluigi Musaro, Mare Nostrum: The Visual Political of a Military-Humanitarian 
Operation in the Mediterranean Sea, 39 MEDIA CULTURE & SOC’Y 11, 12 (2017). 
 11. Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy (no. 27765/09), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2014), available at: 
https://www.refworld.org/cases,ECHR,4f4507942.html. 
 12. Julian Miglierini, Migrants Tell Migrants: Don’t Come to Italy, BBC NEWS (May 
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made the program politically unviable.  The Italian government 
attempted to negotiate with other EU member states to share the 
expense of this program.13  Here too, however, efforts were frustrated 
by right-wing populist elements from other EU member states.14  
Therefore, despite universally acknowledged success in its mission, 
Mare Nostrum eventually ceased operations in October 2014, and 
was replaced by a much more limited operation run by the EU’s 
border agency, Frontex.15 
The results corresponded with what would be expected.  In the 
following two years, the rate of fatalities of Europe-bound African 
migrants attempting to cross the Mediterranean spiked dramatically,16 
punctuated by a shipwreck in April 2015 that cost an estimated 800 
lives.17  This incident, combined with the dramatic surge that year of 
refugees arriving through Turkey from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq, 
thrust the issue of Mediterranean migration into the spotlight of 
European public discourse, creating what became commonly referred 
to as Europe’s “migrant crisis.” 
From 3,538 dead and missing trying to cross the Mediterranean 
in 2014, the figure rose to 3,771 in 2015 and 5,096 in 2016.18  After 
that, figures began to decline again as EU governments reached 
controversial deals with the governments of Libya and Turkey (the 
latter with respect to the somewhat less deadly but still highly 
dangerous route common taken by Middle Eastern migrants from 
Turkey to Greece) to stem the flow of migrants by intercepting them 
before they boarded ships bound for Europe.19  Italy’s deal with 
 
10, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-eu-27352480. 
 13. Steve Scherer & Ilari Polleschi, Italy in Talks with EU to Share Responsibility for 
Boat Migrants, REUTERS (July 8, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-italy-
migrants/italy-in-talks-with-eu-to-share-responsibility-for-boat-migrants-
idUSKBN0FD1YL20140708. 
 14. Emily Koller, Mare Nostrum v. Triton (2017) (unpublished), 
https://munkschool.utoronto.ca/ceres/files/2017/10/Paper-Emily-Koller.pdf. 
 15. The New European Operation Frontex Plus/Triton: an operation with differing 
objectives and more limited means than the Mare Nostrom operation, AEDH (Oct. 13, 
2014), http://www.aedh.eu/en/the-new-european-operation-frontex-plustriton-an-operation-
with-differing-objectives-and-more-limited-means-than-the-mare-nostrum-operation. 
 16. Migrant deaths in Mediterranean hit record in 2016-UN, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 
2016), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-37779228. 
 17. IOM Counts 3,371 Migrant Fatalities in Mediterranean in 2015, ION UN 
MIGRATION (Jan. 5, 2016), https://www.iom.int/news/iom-counts-3771-migrant-fatalities-
mediterranean-2015. 
 18. Operational Data Portal, Mediterranean Situation, UNHCR, 
https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean, (last visited Apr. 28, 2020). 
 19. Declan Walsh & Jason Horowitz, Italy, Going it Alone, Stalls the Flow of Migrants. 
But at What Cost? N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 17, 2017), 
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Libya, reached in February 2017, has been criticized by human rights 
advocacy groups over allegations that it has led to would-be migrants 
being detained in unacceptable conditions in Libyan detention 
centers.20  Some of the alleged abuses suffered by Eritrean and other 
refugees in Libya’s detention centers include: beatings, sexual abuse, 
poor medical care, being trafficked to smugglers, and death.21  There 
are also reports of migrants being shot by the Libyan Coast Guard.22  
A challenge at the European Court of Human Rights is currently 
pending.23 
Further, despite the drop in raw numbers, the Mediterranean 
crossing from Libya to Italy remains more dangerous than it was 
before.  Particularly after 1,200 died attempting this crossing in April 
2015, states and NGOs have attempted to fill the gap in search-and-
rescue operations left by Mare Nostrum, but have not quite succeeded 
(due in part to Italian government efforts to impede NGO rescue 
operations).  In 2014, the only year for which Mare Nostrum was 
operational throughout most of the year, the fatality rate for migrants 
making this crossing stood at 1.81%.24  As of September 2019 it stood 
at 3.63%.25 
Thus, the anti-immigrant backlash associated with the rise of 
illiberal populism in Europe has at least made the Mediterranean 
crossing more difficult and more dangerous for African migrants.  
Quite probably, it has also cost many lives.  It has further induced 
European governments to collaborate and enter agreements with 
repressive governments with questionable human rights records, and 
to turn a blind eye to the abuses these governments are allegedly 
committing in connection with these agreements. 
 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/17/world/europe/italy-libya-migrant-crisis.html. 
 20. A Year after Italy-Libya Migration Deal, Time to Release Thousands Trapped in 
Misery, AMNESTY INT’L (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2018/02/a-
year-after-italy-libya-migration-deal-time-to-release-thousands-trapped-in-misery. 
 21. EU risks fuelling horrific abuse of refugees and migrants in Libya, AMNESTY INT’L 
(June 14, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/06/eu-risks-fuelling-horrific-
abuse-of-refugees-and-migrants-in-libya. 
 22. Id. 
 23. S.S. and others v. Italy (no. 21660/18), Eur. Ct. H.R. (2019). 
 24. Ralph Janik, Mediterranean Refugees: Death Risk Rising, Asylum Prospects 
Sinking, EUROPEAN DATA JOURNALISM (Sept. 7, 2019), 
https://www.europeandatajournalism.eu/eng/News/Data-news/Mediterranean-refugees-
death-risk-rising-asylum-prospects-sinking. 
 25. Mediterranean Migrant Arrivals Reach 76,558 in 2019, Deaths Reach 1,071, IOM 
UN MIGRATION (Oct. 11, 2019), https://www.iom.int/news/mediterranean-migrant-arrivals-
reach-76558-2019-deaths-reach-1071. 
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Despite the foregoing, thousands of migrants from Eritrea and 
other countries in Africa—over 95% of those who attempt it—still 
make the Mediterranean crossing successfully every year and land in 
Europe.  Under international refugee law, these are entitled to claim 
refugee status in Europe.  However Eritrean migrants, like many 
others following the same route, tend not to do so in Italy where they 
land.  Instead they travel from Italy to other countries in the EU or 
the Schengen zone, mostly in the corridor of Germanic language 
speaking countries directly north of Italy, from Switzerland and 
Germany in the south to Norway and Sweden in the north.  Others are 
to be found in countries such as the United Kingdom and France.  
Because of the abysmal social and political conditions in their 
country of origin, Eritreans can typically claim refugee status with a 
very high success rate in these countries.  For instance, in 2017 the 
success rate for asylum applications from Eritrean nationals among 
all EU and EFTA countries was 92.5%, comparable with Syria 
(94.4%) and Yemen (93.3%).26 
European countries receiving asylum applicants from Eritrea 
have largely recognized and complied with their obligations under 
international refugee law.  However, some have sought other means 
to reduce the number of Eritrean refugees. 
For instance, it was in 2014 that the number of Eritrean asylum 
seekers arriving in Europe surged, making them the second largest 
such group after Syrians.  The number of new arrivals in the first 10 
months of that year nearly tripled the number from the previous 
year.27  Following this, various European countries’ immigration 
agencies attempted to revisit their policies towards asylum seekers 
from Eritrea. 
For instance, in November of the same year, the Danish 
Immigration Services (DIS) issued a report suggesting that Eritrean 
nationals who had illegally exited Eritrea or evaded the national 
service there were not at risk of persecution if they returned to 
Eritrea.  Formerly, illegal exit and/or desertion had been a basis for 
recognizing asylum claims by Eritrean nationals.  After the release of 
the report the DIS announced that it would no longer accept asylum 
claims solely on the basis of illegal exit.  However, the report met 
 
 26. Asylum Recognition Rates in the EU/EFTA by Country, 2008-2017, MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE (Mar. 6, 2020), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-
hub/charts/asylum-recognition-rates-euefta-country-2008-2017. 
 27. Divers, Number of Eritreans Seeking Asylum in Europe Soars Over Figures For 
Last Year, UNHCR (Nov. 14, 2014), https://www.unhcr.org/546606286.html. 
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with strong public criticism, including from two of its researchers and 
one of the experts it relied on.  In response, the DIS quickly 
backtracked on its earlier statement and effectively announced that 
operations would continue as before.28  True to its statement, asylum 
acceptance rates for Eritrean applicants in Denmark did not decrease 
between 2014 and 2015; they in fact rose slightly from 93.3% to 
97.5%.29 
However, the DIS’ quick volte-face did not contain all the 
damage.  Because rules on refugee status determination in every 
country are, in theory, derived from the same international law, and 
because simple factual information on Eritrea is applicable anywhere, 
agencies in different countries commonly refer to each other’s 
published materials.  In March 2015, the UK Home Office (the 
executive agency responsible for immigration) issued two briefings, 
partly relying on the Danish report, also suggesting that the risk of 
persecution for Eritrean nationals upon returning to the country was 
not as great as previously thought. 
This time, the Home Office fully implemented the guidance 
given in the new briefings, and asylum application acceptance rates 
from Eritreans in the UK plummeted from 87.1% in 2014 to 47.5% 
the next year.30  However, acceptance rates recovered after a 
significant court decision released in October 2016 ruled that the 
information contained in the March 2015 Home Office briefings was 
not credible.31  Even before that, 87% of applicants refused on the 
basis of the March 2015 briefings had their refusals overturned by 
judges on appeal.32  Internal Home Office documents released to the 
public later revealed that the March 2015 documents were directly 
related to efforts by the Home Office to reduce the number of 
Eritreans granted asylum in the UK.33 
 
 28. MST and Others (national service – risk categories) Eritrea CG, [2016] UKUT 
00443 (IAC), United Kingdom: Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber), at 
paras. 35-41, available at: https://refworld.org/cases,GBR_UTIAC,57fc91fc4.html (last 
visited Apr. 10, 2020). 
 29. See MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE, supra note 26. 
 30. Id. 
 31. MST, supra note 28. 
 32. See Diane Taylor, Home Office Eritrea Guidance Softened to Reduce Asylum Seeker 
Numbers, THE GUARDIAN (Jan. 22, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-
news/2017/jan/22/home-office-eritrea-guidance-softened-to-reduce-asylum-seeker-numbers. 
 33. See id. 
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IV. ERITREAN REFUGEES IN ISRAEL 
From 2006 to 2013, approximately 64,000 individuals from 
Eritrea, Sudan, and several other African countries entered Israel 
seeking asylum via the Sinai desert.34  Of those, an estimated 34,475 
were Eritrean.35  As of the government’s most recent reporting, only 
32,090 African asylum seekers remain, 22,728 of which are 
Eritrean.36 
Israel is a party to the Refugee Convention.  However, as a 
country which follows a dualist legal approach to international law, 
as its fellow common law jurisdictions typically do, Israel’s “treaty 
obligations are not directly enforceable in Israeli courts unless and 
until the Knesset incorporates them into law.”37  Israel has not 
incorporated its obligations under the Refugee Convention into 
domestic law.38 
Until 2013, Israel did not allow Eritreans or Sudanese 
individuals to access refugee status determination (RSD) procedures 
at all.  Since then, the vast majority of applications have been rejected 
or are still pending.  Out of a total of 17,778 applications to the RSD 
unit, only 45 (0.25%) have been successful.39  Israel, for the most 
part, refuses to recognize the claims of what would seem to be 
perfectly legitimate refugees, and instead maintains the official 
position that they are “labour migrants” or “infiltrators” of the state.40  
Instead of legal status, they receive “conditional release” documents.  
The “conditional release” is from detention and deportation, which 
the state maintains it may carry out at any time.41 
In practice, the Israeli government stops short of carrying out 
forcible refoulement of asylum seekers, in compliance with the 
 
 34. Gerry Simpson, “Make Their Lives Miserable”: Israel’s Coercion of Eritrean and 
Sudanese Asylum Seekers to Leave Israel”, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (2014), 
https://www.hrw.org/report/2014/09/09/make-their-lives-miserable/israels-coercion-eritrean-
and-sudanese-asylum-seekers. 
 35. Eli Shani et al, No Safe Haven: Israeli asylum policy as applied to Eritrean and 
Sudanese citizens (December 2014), HOTLINE FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANT WORKERS, 
https://hotline.org.il/en/publication/no-safe-haven. 
 36. Population & Immigration Authority, לארשיב םירז ינותנ  (October 2019), 
https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/reports/foreign_workers_stats_q3_2019/he/foreign_workers_
stats_q3_2019.pdf.   
 37. Ruven Ziegler, No Asylum for ‘Infiltrators’: The Legal Predicament of Eritrean and 
Sudanese Nationals in Israel, 29:2 J. IMMIGR., ASYLUM, & NAT’LITY L. 172, 174 (2015). 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 181. 
 40. Id. at 189. 
 41. Id. at 181-82. 
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Refugee Convention.42  Instead, however, it follows a tactic of 
making conditions of life for asylum seekers in Israel such that they 
are “persuaded” to leave on their own. 
A central component of this strategy of pressuring Eritreans into 
leaving has been the immigration detention system.  The largest 
single institution used for this purpose was the Holot facility, which 
opened in December 2013 and saw the detention of 13,000 male 
asylum seekers until it shut in 2018.43  Initially designed for indefinite 
detention, challenges by human rights organizations to the High 
Court of Justice forced the government to reduce the period of 
detention or close the facility, leading to one year detention periods.44  
From 2007 to 2013, Eritrean women and children were also detained 
in the Saharonim prison.45 
Additionally, from May 2017, the Israeli government has 
required employers to deduct 20% of asylum seekers’ wages to be 
put in a designated fund that can only be accessed if and when the 
individual leaves Israel.46  This resulted in many asylum seekers 
being paid below minimum wage, undocumented employment, 
poverty, and working more physically demanding labor.47  
Furthermore, the employment rights organization which assisted 
asylum seekers in accessing their funds reported that in 45% of cases, 
employers had either not deposited funds at all or deposited 
incomplete amounts.48  This provided a further impetus for Eritrean 
and other asylum seekers to leave the country – although this 
measure, too, was challenged in court and ultimately struck down by 
the Israeli Supreme Court in April 2020. 
The country also purportedly entered into agreements with 
 
 42. Id. at 180. 
 43. Anat Guthmann, Immigration Detention in Israel: Annual Monitoring Report 2018, 
HOTLINE FOR REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS (2018), 
https://hotline.org.il/en/immigrationdetentionmonitoring2018. 
 44. Id. 
 45. HOTLINE FOR MIGRANT WORKERS, Detention of Minors and Children Arriving from 
the Sinai Desert (September 23, 2012), https://hotline.org.il/en/publication/detention-of-
minors-and-children-arriving-from-the-sinai-desert/. 
 46. Anat Guthmann & Noa Kaufmann, In Broad Daylight: The Deposit Law: 





 47. Id. at 11. 
 48. Id. at 24. 
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Uganda and Rwanda in 2014 to receive asylum seekers who had 
“voluntarily” left Israel, to give them a more enticing option than 
returning to their home countries.49  Reports by NGOs have argued 
that this system is hardly voluntary as individuals are given a choice 
between indefinite detention and deportation.50  These reports also 
found that those who were transferred to Rwanda and Uganda were 
not given refugee status nor state protection, contrary to assurances 
made by Israeli officials.51 
In 2017, the Supreme Court of Israel stated that it would not be a 
violation of Israeli law to forcefully deport individuals if it was to 
safe third countries, and subsequently the Knesset voted for a bill to 
allow for deportations.52  However, the UN Committee against 
Torture has stated that collective deportation, without an objective 
examination of individual cases in regard to personal risk, would still 
violate the obligation against non-refoulement.53 
In 2018, human rights advocates filed a challenge to the bill in 
Israeli court.  The court demanded that the state attorney produce the 
agreements with third countries and that the deportations should be 
suspended until the court can assess the agreements.54  The Israeli 
government failed to produce the agreements and subsequently 
abandoned forced deportation plans.55  Israel’s lack of elected 
 
 49. The agreements are considered “secret” because their contents have still not been 
released but it is widely believed that individuals were sent to Rwanda or Uganda. See e.g., 
Michael Schaeffer, Rwanda is out, but Israel says it can still deport refugees to — Uganda?, 
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government over the last year has prevented further similar bills. 
“Voluntary” deportations continue, however, averaging about 185 
Eritreans per month in 2019.56  The government has not published 
their destinations, leaving it unknown how many are setting up new 
lives in Canada or beginning a new journey for safety in Africa. 
These measures against asylum seekers have been fueled by 
anti-refugee sentiment in the public and political arenas.  In 2018, the 
Netanyahu government signed an unprecedented agreement with the 
UNHCR to give temporary legal status to over 20,000 asylum seekers 
in exchange for the UNHCR resettling 16,250 in its partner countries.  
Within just a few hours, Netanyahu reneged on his agreement as a 
result of criticism from Naftali Bennet, the leader of a far-right party 
within the ruling coalition.57  What could have been a model for 
responsibility sharing in refugee resettlement was lost due to the 
same illiberal populist elements endangering the lives of asylum 
seekers globally. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Thus, Eritreans fleeing repression in their home country have in 
recent years encountered rising levels of hostility in both Europe and 
Israel.  In both places, populist elements have prompted governments 
to adopt various measures to both reduce the number of arrivals as 
well as reduce the numbers already inside the country.  These 
measures have had serious deleterious impacts on the lives and safety 
of Eritrean refugees there. 
The example of Eritrean migrants in this part of the world 
merely illustrates the impact that populism can have on the 
experience of any group of immigrants or refugees anywhere.  It has 
made the lives of Eritrean migrants more difficult and less safe.  The 
popularity of hardline anti-immigrant policies and the politicians who 
espouse them has induced governments to adopt measures to reduce 
the flow of migration, often in ways that are inconsistent with the 
humanitarian principles embodied in the Refugee Convention. 
However, there is perhaps some small measure of comfort that 
can be derived in the circumstances.  Although these countries have 
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attempted many different ways to circumvent their obligations under 
the Refugee Convention, none have gone so far as to directly and 
openly contravene them.  The fact that the international refugee law 
system has been tested but has so far held firm shows that it is 
serving its purpose.  International laws on refugee protection exist 
precisely because states are often inclined to act differently than how 
the law prescribes.  That this should turn out to be the case is not by 
itself necessarily alarming or even surprising.  Ultimately, where 
courts have upheld the rights of refugees, those rulings have 
generally been respected and the rule of law has prevailed. 
Further, some coordinated attempts are being made to buttress 
the international refugee protection system to avoid some of the 
problems that have arisen in the past few years.  For instance, the 
Global Compact on Refugees was created by UN member states in 
2018.  Whereas the Refugee Convention sets out the international 
legal obligations of states towards refugees, the Global Compact 
focuses on how those obligations can be shared between states.  
Although it is not legally binding, it hopes to engender the 
mobilization of political will and international cooperation required 
to provide effective coordinated protection for refugees globally.58 
Of course, none of this is of any solace to those who drowned in 
the Mediterranean.  What is more, every attack erodes the system a 
little further. Today’s populists are not the first to direct hostility at 
the institutions that protect immigrants and refugees and their rights.  
However, they have certainly inflicted damage upon those 
institutions.  It is unclear if that damage can or ever will be repaired. 
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